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Effects of Tobin Taxes in Minority Game
markets
Abstract
We show that the introduction of Tobin taxes in agent-based models of currency
markets can lead to a reduction of both speculative trading and the magnitude of
exchange rate fluctuations at intermediate tax rates. In this regime revenues ob-
tained from speculators are maximal for the institutions acting as market makers.
We here focus on Minority Game models of markets, which are accessible by exact
techniques from statistical mechanics. Results are supported by computer simula-
tions. Our findings suggest that at finite systems sizes the effect is most pronounced
in a critical region around the phase transition of the infinite system, but much
weaker if the market is operating far from criticality and does not exhibit anoma-
lous fluctuations.
Key words: Tobin tax, Minority Games.
JEL classification numbers: C63, F31, G18.
1 Introduction
In 1972 James Tobin proposed to “throw some sand in the wheels of our
excessively efficient international money markets” (published in Tobin 1974)
by imposing a tax of 0.05 to 0.5% on all Foreign Currency Exchange (FX).
The Bretton Woods agreement (a system of fixed foreign exchange rates tied
to the price of gold) at that time was gradually being dismantled, with the
USA stepping out in 1971. This system had been introduced in the wake of
World War II in order to rebuild global capitalism. Tobin feared the effects
of countries exposed to freely fluctuating exchange rates and suggested, as a
second best solution, the introduction of what is now called a ‘Tobin tax’ in
order to suppress speculative trading, thus allowing domestic macro-economic
management.
Since then, under floating exchange rates, the trading volume on interna-
tional currency markets has grown sharply, especially after the introduction
of electronic trading, reaching a level of 1.9 trillion US-Dollar per day in 2004
(Galati and Melvin 2004). Empirical research has shown that FX rates’ evolu-
tion is ‘disconnected’ from the dynamics of the macro-economic fundamentals
Preprint submitted to Elsevier 23 October 2008
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it should depend on and, in particular, that they fluctuate much more than
such a dependence would suggest (as a survey see Frankel and Rose 1995).
While the Tobin tax has never been implemented in reality, the discussion of
this issue is still lively and opinions are widely divided. 1 Proponents, assum-
ing that excess volatility is due to speculators, claim that a Tobin tax would
decrease volatility, because it would make speculative trading unprofitable,
hence reducing volume. In addition, the tax would improve the situation of
countries damaged by international currency speculation. Opponents reject
the proposal, claiming that its implementation would hardly be feasible and
would be ineffective if not agreed by all countries. It could change unpre-
dictably the market structure, eventually damaging developing countries, and
moreover, through a reduction of market liquidity, Tobin taxes might indeed
result in more, not less volatility.
This has called for a closer look in the micro-structure of FX markets (Eichen-
green et al. 1995, Frankel 1996, Mende and Menkhoff 2003, Osler 2006). This
research has shown that, as in other markets, currencies are driven by order
flows, and at horizons of one day or more, these originate from two main
types of traders: commercial traders (i.e. non-financial firms engaged in in-
ternational trade who need currency as part of their primary business), and
financial traders (i.e. institutional asset managers who care for profits gener-
ated in the trading activity). Both commercial and financial traders act on
time horizons of one day or longer, and their activities are negatively corre-
lated to each other, “meaning that at horizons of a day or longer financial
demand tend to be met by commercial supply” (Osler). A third group of “liq-
uidity or noise traders”, in Osler, or banks, in Mende and Menkhoff, who trade
in a manner that is unrelated to information flows, is mainly responsible for
FX activity at shorter time-scales. These issues have also been addressed from
the more theoretical approach to modeling financial markets. Research has
departed from models based on the rational expectations paradigm such as
Bacchetta and Wincoop (2000) and has focused on models that are capable
of reproducing excess volatility and the typical features of fluctuations in real
markets (the so-called stylized facts discussed by Cont 2001) and are there-
fore well-suited to shed light on the effects of introducing a Tobin tax. One
strand of research has concentrated on models of interacting agents with het-
erogeneous (adaptive) expectations (see the survey by Hommes 2006). These
consider agents with an optimizing behavior with respect to an expectation
model. Two main types of expectations are considered: those of fundamen-
talists who expect current price to revert to the fundamental price and trend
followers (or chartists), who expect exchange rates to follow a trend.
1 A compendium of the different points of view and arguments is in ul Haq et al.
(Eds.) 1996. The question about possible implementation is not only academic; con-
trasting references are Ramonet (1997) and European Banking Federation (2001).
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DeGrauwe and Grimaldi (2006) have shown that this approach can be adapted
to modeling FX markets, obtaining three main empirical facts: the ‘disconnect’
puzzle, excess volatility, and non-normality. Westerhoff (2003) analyzed Tobin
tax in this framework, showing that its introduction reduces volatility. West-
erhoff and Dieci (2006) find moreover that if agents can trade on multiple
markets and a Tobin tax is introduced in one of them, that markets stabi-
lize and become attractive for risk–averse investors. If market regulators are
competing on investors, the Tobin tax introduction would follow in the other
markets as well. 2
A completely different approach, has been taken by Ehrenstein et al. (2005)
in zero intelligence atomistic models based on percolation theory (Cont and
Bouchaud 2000). These models relate the emergence of excess volatility and
fat tails in the distribution of returns to herding behavior in the population of
traders. Ehrenstein et al. show that generally the introduction of a Tobin tax
brings about a reduction in volatility, as long as the tax rate is not too high
to cause liquidity problems. This second class of models, though neglecting
any notion of optimizing behavior, has the virtue of taking into account the
discrete nature of traders, whereas in the heterogeneous agent approach only
the effect of the aggregate demand of different types of traders matters.
The present paper addresses similar general questions but from a different
approach, that of Minority Games (MG) (see Challet et al. 2005, Coolen 2005
and Johnson et al. 2003). These are stylized models that depict a financial mar-
ket as an ecology of different types of agents interacting along an ‘information
food chain’ where speculators ‘predate’ on market inefficiencies (arbitrage op-
portunities) created by other investors. 3 This is particularly suited for FX
markets as it captures the interplay between commercial traders and financial
speculators. In addition, at odds with the heterogeneous agent approach, the
demands on the market are not just the aggregated demands of a few trader
types, but in principle every agent differs from the others and full heterogene-
ity is considered. 4
2 As we discussed above, one argument against the Tobin tax is that it would be
difficult to coordinate all markets for its adoption. The result of Westerhoff and
Dieci is a good counterargument.
3 In the MG setup the speculators try to play against the market, so they act as
contrarians. This assumption seems incompatible with the usual one of speculators
as trend followers. What these agents, however, try to do is to anticipate a reversion
of the market trend (e.g. ride a bubble up to the very last minute). This is compatible
with most of the technical trading, from moving averages to ‘scalping’, so that
contrarian speculators are actually trend followers who try to anticipate the market
(see e.g. the model proposed in Chiarella et al. 2006).
4 Empirical works such as Frankel, and Osler, find the negative correlation discussed
above between the orders of commercial and financial traders. The micro–founded
models (Westerhoff, DeGrauwe and Grimaldi, and Westerhoff and Dieci) mimic this
negative correlation with the interplay between fundamentalists and chartists: when
real prices’ drift departs from the fundamental prices, the orders of these two types
3
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The MG highlights the tradeoff between volatility and market efficiency in a
vivid though admittedly simplified and stylized way. Indeed the analysis of
the MG has revealed that within this model framework excess volatility and
market efficiencies are identified as two sides of the same coin, both resulting
as consequences of speculative trading. The MG exhibits two different regimes,
one in which the market is fully efficient and another in which arbitrage op-
portunities are not entirely eliminated by the dynamics of the agents. These
regimes are separated sharply in the parameter space of the model, and it
turns out that the boundary at which the market becomes efficient coincides
precisely with the locus of a phase transition in the language of statistical
physics. At the same time non-trivial fluctuations in the returns, very similar
to the stylized facts observed in real market data, emerge in the vicinity of this
transition but not further away (Challet and Marsili 2003). 5 Hence, at odds
with previous models, the MG allows us to investigate how the introduction
of transactions taxes affects the information ecology and market efficiency.
A further advantage of the MG over the other heterogeneous agent–based ap-
proaches discussed above lies in the fact that, despite its stylized nature, it
exhibits a remarkably rich phenomenology that can be understood fully an-
alytically with tools of statistical physics of disordered systems (as discussed
in Challet et al. 2005 and Coolen). Analytical tractability provides an under-
standing that is much more complete than that based on numerical simula-
tions. In particular it is possible to derive closed analytical expressions for key
observable variables such as the market volatility, the trading activity of the
agents and the revenue for the market maker (as will be defined).
In brief, our main result is that within the picture of the MG model, a small
tax decreases volatility whenever a market with a finite number of traders
exhibits anomalous fluctuations. Indeed the fundamental effect of the tax is
to draw the market away from the critical point discussed above. As the oc-
currence of anomalous fluctuations and their size depend inversely on the size
(i.e. number of agents) of the market, the introduction of a Tobin tax has a
weaker impact as the size of the market increases. At the same time, the tax
introduces an information inefficiency, and thus too high a tax might not be
advisable. The total revenue from the tax exhibits a maximum for intermedi-
ate rates similar to what was found in earlier works on different models (as
of traders are anticorrelated. Also the two types of agents considered in the MG
submit orders that are on average negatively correlated, but in a more heterogeneous
way.
5 The two regimes of the model are characterized respectively by high market ef-
ficiency and many speculators at one side, market inefficiency and few speculators
at the other. If speculators were allowed to enter the market when expected profits
are high and leave it when they are low, the system would balance itself exactly
in–between the two regimes (i.e. close to the transition point). This stylized model
is therefore explicative on why we observe only the phase–transition dynamics in
real markets, as discussed in Challet and Marsili.
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in Ehrenstein 2002). Furthermore, the effects of imposing a tax materialize in
the market behavior only after times that scale inversely with the tax rate.
Extremely small tax rates may thus need a long time to stabilize turbulent
markets. This can be quite relevant if this time scale becomes comparable to
that over which market’s composition changes because then speculators may
fail to ‘learn’ how to coordinate on low volatility states. Introducing a Tobin
tax reduces the time needed to reach coordination, thus reducing the volatility
significantly even in an infinite system.
In the following we shall first introduce the grand-canonical MG (GCMG) and
re-iterate its known main features, while technical details are in the Appendix
(available on the JEBO website). In Sections 3 and 4 we comment on how a
tax on transactions can be introduced and discuss the effects on the market
within the present model. In Section 5 we turn to a brief discussion on how to
relate these outcomes to real markets, summarize our results, and give some
final concluding remarks.
2 The Grand-canonical Minority Game
2.1 The model
The so-called grand-canonical MG (GCMG) describes a simple market of N
agents i = 1, . . . , N who at each round of the game make a binary trading
decision (to buy or to sell) or who each may decide to refrain from trading.
They thus each submit bids bi(t) ∈ {−1, 0, 1} in every trading period t =
0, 1, 2, . . ., resulting in a total excess demand of A(t) =
∑N
i=1 bi(t).
These trading decisions are taken to be based on a stream of information
available to the agents. This common information on the state of the market
(or on other factors relevant to the market) is encoded in an integer variable
µ(t) at time t taking values in {1, 2, . . . , P}. 6 Here we assume that µ(t) models
an exogenous news arrival process and that the {µ(t)} are drawn at random
from the set {1, . . . , P}, independently and with equal probabilities at each
time. 7 The objective of each agent is to be in the minority at each time-step
6 This is an assumption on the cognitive limitation of agents because the game
itself will generate much richer information than just the sequence µ(t).
7 This contrasts with the definition of µ(t) in the original MG, where the informa-
tion was endogenously generated by the market, with µ(t) encoding the sign of the
past M = log2 P price changes. Most collective properties of the model have been
shown to be affected only weakly by the origin of information. We focus here on the
simpler case of exogenous information, which is analytically more convenient. Note
however that analytical approaches to MGs with endogenous information are also
feasible, but involve much more intricate mathematics (as in Coolen).
5
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(i.e. to place a bid bi(t) that has the opposite sign of the total bid A(t).)
This minority setup, discussed in previous section, corresponds to contrarian
behavior and can be derived from a market mechanism taking into account the
expectations of the traders on the future behavior of the market (Marsili 2001).
In order to do so, each agent has a ‘trading strategy’ at his disposal. Trader i’s
strategy is labeled by ai = (a
µ
i )µ=1,...,P ∈ {−1, 1}P and provides a map from all
values of the information µ onto the binary set {−1, 1} of actions (buy/sell).
Upon receiving information µ the trading strategy of agent i thus prescribes to
take the trading action a
µ
i ∈ {−1, 1}. These strategies are assigned at random
and with no correlations at the beginning of the game, and then they remain
fixed. 8 Agents in the GCMG are adaptive and may decide not to trade if they
do not consider their strategy adequate. More precisely, each agent keeps a
score ui(t) measuring the performance of his strategy vector. He then trades
at a given time-step t only if his strategy has a positive score ui(t) > 0 at
that time. Therefore, the bids of agents take the form bi(t) = ni(t)a
µ(t)
i with
ni(t) = 1 if ui(t) > 0 and ni(t) = 0 otherwise. Accordingly the excess demand
is given by
A(t) =
N∑
i=1
ni(t)a
µ(t)
i . (1)
Agent i keeps a record of the past performance of his strategy a
µ
i by updating
the score ui(t) as follows:
ui(t+ 1) = ui(t)− aµ(t)i A(t)− εi, (2)
at each step, with constant εi. The first term −aµ(t)i A(t) is the Minority Game
payoff; it is positive whenever the trading action a
µ(t)
i proposed by i’s strategy
vector and the aggregate bid A(t) are of opposite signs, and negative whenever
i joins the majority decision. The idea of Equation (2) is that whenever the
payoff −aµ(t)i A(t) is larger than εi, the score of player i’s strategy is increased;
otherwise it is decreased. The constant εi in (2) thus captures the inclination of
agent i to trade in the market. This inclination will in general be heterogeneous
across the population of agents, with agents with high values of εi being more
cautious to trade than agents with low εi. In our simplified model we consider
only two types of agents. First we assume that there are Ns ≤ N financial
speculators who trade only if their perceived market profit obtained by using
their strategy exceeds a given threshold, and hence we set εi = ε ≥ 0 for such
agents. Here ε can be considered as the speculative margin of gain in a single
8 We here assume that each agent holds only one trading strategy. Generalizations
to multiple strategies per player are straightforward (Shayeghi and Coolen 2006 and
De Martino et al 2007) and can be seen not to alter the qualitative behavior of the
model. Hence we here restrict to the simplest case.
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transaction.
The remaining Nc = N −Ns agents (the commercial traders) are assumed to
trade no matter what, so a tax would not affect their behavior. Mathematically
this is implemented by setting εi = −∞ for this second group of agents. They
have ni(t) = 1 for all times t. For convenience we will order the agents such
that speculators carry the indices i = 1, . . . , Ns and commercial traders the
labels i = Ns + 1, . . . , N .
2.2 Price process, volatility and predictability
Within the MG setup the market volatility is then given by
σ
2 =
〈A(t)2〉
N
, (3)
where 〈. . .〉 will stand for a time-average in the stationary state of the model
from now on. The normalization to the number of agents N is here introduced
to guarantee a finite value of σ2 in the infinite-system limit, with which the
statistical mechanics analysis of the model is concerned.
The information variable µ(t) allows one to quantify information-efficiency of
the model market by computing the predictability
H =
1
PN
P∑
µ=1
〈A|µ〉2 (4)
where 〈. . . |µ〉 denotes an average conditional on the occurrence of information
pattern µ(t) = µ. A value H 6= 0 indicates that for some µ the minority payoff
is statistically predictable 〈A(t)|µ〉 6= 0, whereas the market is unpredictable
and fully informationally efficient when H = 0.
The simplest way to relate this picture to a financial market is to postulate a
simple linear impact of A(t) on the (logarithmic) price (or the exchange rate);
that is, assume that
p(t+ 1) = p(t) +
A(t)
λ
, (5)
where {p(t)} denotes a price (exchange rate) process and where λ is the liq-
uidity. Equation (5) can be justified, as usual, assuming a market maker with
a high currency availability who satisfies orders and balances the prices. 9 The
liquidity typically increases with the volume (i.e. with the number of traders in
9 The market maker hypothesis was first adopted in heterogeneous agent–based
models for financial markets by Beja and Goldman (1980), then by Day and Huang
7
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this context). For convenience, 10 we make the simple assumption λ =
√
N , so
that σ2 becomes the volatility of the price process, σ2 = 〈(p(t+ 1)− p(t))2〉.
Notice that the notion of information efficiency provided by the value of H is
somewhat more primitive than the usual one, which relates to the deviation
of prices from fundamentals as it directly relates to the possibility of predict-
ing the market. In a na¨ıve view, one might regard the action of commercial
traders as mimicking the contribution of fundamental trading (i.e. trading re-
lated solely on the stream of information µ(t) arriving to the market). This
contribution arrives through the behavior of financial speculators (i.e. of adap-
tive agents).
2.3 The behavior of the GCMG
The GCMG has been studied in great detail in Challet and Marsili and Chal-
let et al. (2006), with methods well established in statistical mechanics. The
analysis is here generally concerned with the stationary states of the system
(i.e. with the behavior reached after running the learning dynamics of the
agents for some sufficiently long transient equilibration time).
The statistical mechanics approach provides exact results for the model in
the limit of infinite market sizes, where one takes the number of agents N =
Ns +Nc and the number P of possible different information states to infinity,
while at the same time keeping the ratios ns = Ns/P and nc = Nc/P fixed
and finite. ns and nc along with ε are thus control parameters of the model.
This approach makes it possible to derive exact expressions for several quan-
tities, including the predictability H , and upon neglecting time-dependent
correlations accurate approximations for the volatility σ2 can be found (see
also Marsili and Challet 2001, and Heimel and Coolen 2001). We will not enter
here the detailed mathematics of the calculations, based on the replica method
(1990), and became a standard assumption thereafter. Assuming the presence of
a market maker in real foreign exchange markets is a strong simplification. This
is because of the less rigorous institutionalization of foreign exchange markets as
compared to financial markets. What we mean by ‘market maker’ is the set of
actively trading banks in the market and of the public institutions that may benefit
from taxation.
10 The dependence of liquidity on trading volume has indeed been advocated as a
possible source of problems when a tax on transaction is levied. The reason is that a
reduction in volume may make the market less liquid and hence increase volatility.
This argument does not apply to our model, because the volume of commercial
traders is not affected by the tax, and therefore the reduction in the volume is only
moderate. We explicitly checked that, even in the case where λ is proportional to
the number of active traders, as suggested in Marsili on the basis of a different
market mechanism, the qualitative behavior of numerical simulations is the same
as that discussed below for the simpler choice, λ =
√
N .
8
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of statistical physics (Mezard et al. 1987). The resulting equations for the key
quantities in the stationary states as well as a sketch of their derivation are
found in the Appendix (available on JEBO website). Further details regarding
the statistical mechanics analysis of MGs and GCMGs can be found in Challet
and Marsili, Challet et al. (2005), Coolen, and in references therein.
[Figure 1 approximately here]
The overall picture that emerges is the following: at fixed nc, the statistical
behavior of the model is characterized by a critical line at ε = 0 that extends
beyond some critical value ns ≥ n⋆s(nc). This is illustrated in Figure 1. As this
line (segment) is approached in parameter space the market becomes more
and more efficient (i.e. H → 0 as ε → 0 for ns ≥ n⋆s). On the critical line
(ε = 0, ns ≥ n⋆s) itself the market is fully efficient, and one finds H = 0 ex-
actly in the limit of infinite system size. In addition, numerical simulations of
the model at finite sizes close to the critical line reveal fluctuation properties
similar to those observed in real markets (and discussed in Cont). In partic-
ular A(t) has a fat tailed distribution, and one observes volatility clustering.
These effects become weaker as the system size is increased at constant values
of ns, nc and ε, and similarly they disappear gradually when one moves away
from the critical line at fixed system size.
The case ε = 0 and ns > n
⋆
s(nc) is peculiar because it turns out that the sta-
tionary state is here not unique, but rather it depends on the initial conditions
from which simulations are started. In the following we will not consider the
case of a strictly vanishing ε, but will assume instead that speculators have a
positive profit margin ε > 0, even if the latter may be small. All simulations
on which we report are started from zero initial conditions ui(t = 0) = 0 for
i = 1, . . . , Ns.
We finally remark that a detailed analysis of the transient dynamics demon-
strates that for small ε the stationary state is reached after a characteristic
equilibration time that scales as 1/ε. For ε ≪ 1, such a long equilibration
becomes relevant if the market composition changes in time, as discussed in
Section 4.
3 Tobin tax in the GCMG
Within the model setup the introduction of a tax τ on each transaction can be
accounted for by a change εi → εi + τ for all i = 1, . . . , N . Indeed by raising
ε by an amount τ , an additional cost τ incurs every time for any given agent
who trades and no costs for agents who refrain from trading. Note that the
trading volume of any fixed (active) agent is one unit in our simple setup so
that τ indeed corresponds to a transaction tax per unit traded. Hence we will
9
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assume
εi =


ε+ τ i ≤ Ns
−∞ i > Ns
(6)
in the following. While this will discourage speculators from trading (via the
reduction of their strategy score), such a tax will have no effect on the par-
ticipation of commercial traders. They will trade at every time step as before
(ni(t) = 1 ∀i > Ns at all times t).
The total revenue from this tax τ is then given by
R =
τ
N
∑
i
〈ni(t)〉 = τ
N
Ns∑
i=1
〈ni(t)〉+ τ nc
ns + nc
≡ Rs +Rc, (7)
where the first term corresponds to the revenue Rs from speculators and the
second (Rc) to that obtained from the commercial traders.
An evaluation of the effects of levying a tax τ on the GCMG then amounts to
studying the behavior of the model as a function of ε t fixed model parameters
ns and nc. It turns out that here one has to distinguish between two different
regimes, namely close and far away from the phase transition.
[Figure 2 approximately here]
Figure 2 reports the effects of introducing a tax on markets whose parameters
are far from the critical line. We here consider nc = 1 and ns = 1 < n
⋆
s(nc =
1) ≈ 4.15, so that one operates sufficiently far to the left of the critical region
depicted in Figure 1. For such parameter values the results of numerical sim-
ulations follow the curves predicted by the analytical theory perfectly, and no
anomalous fluctuations are present in the corresponding price time-series. The
tax has very mild effect both on volatility and on the information efficiency,
as long as ε + τ ≪ 1. Figure 2 also shows that the contribution of specula-
tors to the tax revenue has a peak at intermediate tax rates, but that at the
same time the revenue Rs obtained from speculators is smaller than that from
institutional investors.
[Figure 3 approximately here]
Figure 3 on the other hand illustrates the response of the market at the other
extreme where ns ≫ n⋆s(nc). For such values of the parameters one is within
the critical region (for small enough ε + τ), and the model exhibits strong
anomalous price fluctuations for market sizes of a few thousand agents. The
deviations from the analytical theory (which is valid only in the limit of infinite
systems) mark strong finite-size effects in the critical region. As illustrated
in the lower panel of Figure 3, imposing a sufficiently large tax may in such
10
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markets have a pronounced effect on the volatility, whereas smaller transaction
fees may influence the time-series of the market only marginally.
[Figure 4 approximately here]
Figure 4 presents a systematic account of these effects and shows the depen-
dence of the volatility, the predictability, and the revenue from the tax on the
system size and the tax rate τ at ns ≫ n⋆s(nc). In particular, a significant
reduction of the market volatility can be obtained while still keeping the mar-
ket relatively information efficient. Furthermore, the contribution to the tax
revenue of speculators largely outweighs that of producers, and it is peaked
at a value close to that where the volatility is minimal. The effect of a tax,
as shown in Figure 4, also depends on the size of the market. The volatility
at low ε+ τ indeed decreases with the size of the system and approaches the
theoretical line, making a tax more effective in small than in large markets.
[Figure 5 approximately here]
Figure 5 relates these two extremes and discusses the dependence of the volatil-
ity on ns at intermediate number of speculators for fixed nc = 1. We here fix
the (effective) system size by keeping L = PNs constant. For small values of
ns one is then well outside the critical region, and the numerical results follow
the analytical predictions (solid lines in Figure 5). As discussed in Challet and
Marsili, the simulations then deviate systematically from the theory at large
ns when the system has entered the zone near the phase transition line. More
precisely, one finds a threshold value ns(L) > n
⋆
s so that numerical simulations
agree with the theoretical lines for ns < ns(L), but deviations and anomalous
fluctuations are observed for ns > ns(L). As L is increased ns(L) is found
to grow as well in simulations (not shown here), and in particular one has
limL→∞ ns(L) = ∞ (at ε + τ 6= 0) so that the critical region vanishes in the
limit of infinite systems.
4 Markets with evolving composition of agents
In the previous sections we have assumed that all traders stay in the market
for an infinite amount of time and that their trading strategies remain fixed
forever. Individual agents have the option to abstain from trading at interme-
diate times and to join the market again at a later stage, but no agent in the
setup considered thus far can actually modify his strategy vector {aµi }. Thus
the composition of the population of traders does not change over time. In
real-market situations however it would appear more sensible to expect some
fluctuation in the population of traders and to assume that the market com-
position will evolve and/or that strategies get replaced after some time. In the
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latter case, one would expect poorly performing strategies to be removed from
the market and replaced by new ones.
In this section we consider the simplest case of an evolving composition of the
market, namely a situation in which agents (or equivalently their strategies)
are replaced randomly, irrespective of their performance. More precisely, at
each time step each speculator is removed with a probability 1/(θNsP ) and
replaced by a new one with randomly drawn strategy and zero initial score.
Here θ is a constant, independent of the system size. This choice θ = O(L0)
guarantees that the expected survival time of any individual agent scales as
NsP so that one exit/entry event occurs in the entire population on aver-
age over a period of θP transaction time steps. Relaxation times in Minority
Games are known to be of the order of P , so the above scaling of θ results
in the composition of the market changing slowly on times comparable with
those on which the system relaxes. Indeed, extensive numerical simulations
show that the behavior of the volatility on θ as well as that of other quanti-
ties characterizing the collective behavior of the system is independent of the
system size (see Figure 6). This is in sharp contrast with the strong finite size
effects observed for ns ≫ n⋆s at a fixed composition of the population of agents
(Figure 4).
[Figure 6 approximately here]
The main feature of the MG market with an evolving population of agents is
a pronounced minimum of the volatility as a function of ε+ τ in the crowded
regime ns > n
⋆
s. In particular the volatility increases as ε + τ is decreased,
even in the limit of large system sizes (in which a corresponding system with
fixed agent population would equilibrate to the flat theoretical line as shown
in Figure 4). This behavior of the system with changing agent structure can
be related to the fact that relaxation time of the GCMG scales as 1/(ε+ τ).
Thus, when ǫ + τ is very small, the time it would take a fixed population of
agents to equilibrate collectively can be much larger than the time scale θP
over which the market composition changes. In this case, the market remains
in a highly volatile state indefinitely because the agents do not have sufficient
time to ‘coordinate’ and to adjust their respective behavior since the strategy
pool represented in the evolving population of agents changes too quickly. Fig-
ure 6 demonstrates that introducing a tax in such markets with dynamically
evolving trader structure can reduce the volatility considerably.
5 Conclusions
We have shown how the theoretical picture derived for the GCMG (Challet
and Marsili, Challet et al. 2005, Coolen) can be used to characterize fully the
impact of a Tobin tax on this toy model of a currency market. The main re-
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sult of our study (see Figure 4) is that within the GCMG the introduction of
a Tobin Tax reduces the market volatility whenever the market is operating
close to the critical line (ε = 0, ns > n
⋆
s) of informationally efficient markets
(H = 0). This region of parameter space is the one relevant for real markets
1) because real markets are believed to be nearly efficient and 2) because only
in this region does the model exhibit stylized facts, such as a fat tailed return
distributions and volatility clustering, qualitatively similar to those of real
markets.
Within the simplified picture of the GCMG, we find that if the market is
far from the critical line, the introduction of a tax has a weak effect on the
volatility. If instead the market operates close to the critical line, then a tax τ
draws the market away from the critical region in parameter space, and thus
reducing volatility. Furthermore, the size of anomalous fluctuations and of the
region where they occur depend inversely on the system size, suggesting that
the introduction of a tax might be particularly effective in small markets.
In all cases we find that the contribution of speculators to the revenue for the
market maker from the tax attains a maximal value at intermediate tax rates.
In the case of a market near criticality, this occurs approximately at a tax
rate at which the reduction in volatility is largest. In both shown examples
(Figures 2 and 4) the revenue for the market maker appears to weight more
on commercial traders than on speculators. Only for unrealistic cases when
the number of commercial traders is extremely small or when ε < 0 does one
observe instances in which the contribution of speculators is largest.
Finally our findings demonstrate that imposing a tax can also reduce the
market volatility in cases where the composition of the population of traders
changes slowly over time. In this case, the tax allows the agents to reach a
coordinated state faster so that the market can reach a stationary state of
relatively low volatility.
Given the stylized nature of the MG, it is hard to make a connection between
the model parameter τ and an actual tax rate in a real-world market. At any
rate it seems reasonable to assume that a realistic tax rate should be of the
order or smaller than the margin of profit of speculators, which is gauged by ε
in the GCMG. The optimal tax rate τ might be unrealistically large compared
to ε. For example in Figure 4 if ε = 0.01 volatility can be substantially reduced
only for tax rates τ that are more than ten times larger.
The GCMG can at best be seen as a minimalistic, simplified version of a real
market. Hence our conclusions on the behavior of the MG are at most sug-
gestive with respect to what might happen in the real world. Still, thanks to
its analytic tractability, the Minority Game provides a coherent picture of the
interplay between stochastic fluctuations and information efficiency going far
beyond the insights of zero–intelligence or agent based models. The picture
developed here can be extended in a number of directions toward more real-
istic market modes without giving up analytical tractability. One of the most
interesting future directions might be to endow agents with individual wealth
variables that evolve according to their relative success when trading in the
13
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model market.
Appendix
We here sketch the theoretical analysis of the model with τ = 0 and general
values of ε. The introduction of a tax τ can be accounted for by replacing
ε→ ε+τ in all equations below. The starting point of the statistical mechanics
approach is the function
Hε[{φi}] = 1
P
P∑
µ=1
[
N∑
i=1
a
µ
i φi
]2
+
2ε
P
Ns∑
i=1
φi (8)
of the mean activities {φi = 〈ni(t)〉} of the speculators i = 1, . . . , Ns. The
φi, i = 1, . . . , Ns are continuous variables within the interval [0, 1]; recall that
commercial traders are always active and have φi = 1, i = Ns + 1, . . . , N =
Ns + Nc. Note that this function depends explicitly on the strategy assign-
ments {aµi }, so Hε is a stochastic quantity. The strategy vectors, which are
fixed at the beginning of the game, correspond to what is known as ‘quenched
disorder’ in statistical mechanics. It turns out that the learning dynamics (2)
minimizes the function Hε in terms of the {φi} for any fixed choice of the
strategy vectors. Computing the stationary states of the model thus reduces
to identifying the minima of Hε. It is here possible to characterize these min-
ima using the so-called replica method of statistical physics (Mezard et al.).
A different statistical mechanics approach is based on so-called generating
functionals and deals directly with the update dynamics (2); see Coolen. Both
methods ultimately lead to the same equations describing the stationary states
of the model, so we here restrict the discussion to the former approach.
In the following we give a brief sketch of the so-called replica analysis of the
model, allowing us to compute the minima of the random function Hε. To this
end one first introduces the partition function
Zε(β) =
1∫
0
dφ1 · · ·
1∫
0
dφNs exp (−βHε[φ1, . . . , φNs]) (9)
at an ‘annealing temperature’ T = 1/β. In the limit β → ∞ these integrals
are dominated by configurations {φ1, . . . , φNs} that minimize Hε so that the
evaluation of limβ→∞ Zε(β) allows one to characterize the minima of Hε.
This procedure is in general not feasible for individual realizations of the
random strategy assignments as the dependence of Hε on the {aµi } is quite
intricate. Instead we will compute ‘typical’ quantities in the limit of infinite
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systems (i.e averages over the space of all strategy assignments).
The key quantity to compute here is the free energy density
fε(β) = − lim
N→∞
1
βN
lnZε(β). (10)
The limit N →∞ is here taken at fixed ratios ns = Ns/P and nc = Nc/P (so
that Ns, Nc, P are taken to infinity as well). All relevant properties of the typ-
ical minima of Hε can be read off from the disorder-average of limβ→∞ fε(β).
Using the identity lnZ = limn→0
Zn−1
n
this problem can be reduced to com-
puting averages of Znε that corresponds to an n-fold replicated system with no
interactions between the individual copies. This is referred to as the replica
method in statistical physics and is a standard tool for the analysis of prob-
lems involving quenched disorder (Mezard et al., Challet et al. 2005, Coolen).
The averaging procedure leads to an effective interaction between the repli-
cas and requires an assumption regarding the symmetry of the solution with
respect to permutations of the replicas. In principle this symmetry may be
broken, as different replica copies may end up in different minima of Hε. In
the non-efficient phase of this model, instead, the so-called ‘replica symmetric’
ansatz is exact, simplifying the analysis considerably. We will here not report
the detailed intermediate steps of the calculation, but will only quote the final
outcome, namely a set of closed equations for the variables characterizing the
minima of Hε (and hence the stationary states of the GCMG). Further details
of the replica analysis are found in Challet and Marsili, Challet et al. (2005)
and Coolen.
The minima of Hε turn out to be described by two independent variables K
and ζ , uniquely determined from the following two relations:
ζ =
1√
ns(Q(ζ,K) + nc/ns)
,
K = ε
[
1− ns
2
(
erf[(1 +K)ζ/
√
2]− erf(Kζ/
√
2)
) ]−1
, (11)
with
Q(ζ,K)=
1
2
erfc[(1 +K)ζ/
√
2] +
1
ζ
√
2π
[
(K − 1)e−(1+K)2ζ2/2 −Ke−K2ζ2/2
]
+
1
2
(
K
2 +
1
ζ
2
)(
erf[(1 +K)ζ/
√
2− erf(Kζ/
√
2)
)
, (12)
where erf and erfc are, respectively, the error function encountered when inte-
grating the normal distribution (erf(x) ≡ 2√
π
∫ x
0
e
−t2
dt) and its complementary
(erfc(x) ≡ 1− erf(x)). These equations are easily solved numerically and one
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obtainsK and ζ as functions of the model parameters {ns, nc, ε}. The disorder-
average of quantities such as the predictability H or the mean activity of the
speculators φ = limN→∞N
−1
s
∑Ns
i=1 φi can then be expressed in terms of K and
ζ . One finds
H = ε2
nc + nsQ(ζ,K)
(ns + nc)K2
,
φ=
1
2
erfc[(1 +K)ζ/
√
2] +
1
ζ
√
2π
(
e
−K2ζ2/2 − e−ζ2(1+K)2/2
)
+
K
2
(erf(Kζ/
√
2)− erf[(1 +K)ζ/
√
2]) . (13)
These results are fully exact in the thermodynamic limit, with no approxi-
mations (except for the replica-symmetric ansatz) made at any stage. Finally,
neglecting certain dynamical correlations between agents, the volatility can
be approximated as
σ
2 = ε2
nc + nsQ(ζ,K)
(ns + nc)K2
+ ns
φ−Q(ζ,K)
ns + nc
. (14)
As shown in the main text of the paper this approximation is in excellent
agreement with numerical simulations (up to finite-size and equilibration ef-
fects).
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Figures
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s
(nc)
Fig. 1. Phase diagram of the GCMG in the (ns, ε)-plane at fixed nc. The red line
segment at ε = 0 and ns ≥ n⋆s(nc) marks the phase transition in the limit of
infinite system size. At finite size anomalous fluctuations and stylized facts are
found in a region around this critical line, as indicated by the shaded area. This
so-called ‘critical region’ indicates regions with strong dynamical and finite size
effects and is large for small systems and shrinks towards the critical line segment
in the infinite-size limit.
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Fig. 2. Volatility, predictability (top) and revenue from speculators and producers
(bottom) for ns = nc = 1. Symbols are data obtained from numerical simulations
with PNs = 6000, every data point is an average over at least 1000 samples, simu-
lations are run for 1000P steps, with measurements taken in the second half of this
interval. Lines are the corresponding predictions for infinite systems obtained from
the analytical theory.
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Fig. 3. Effect of introducing a tax on the exchange rate fluctuations A(t). Each panel
corresponds to a single run with parameters ns = 60, nc = 1, PNs = 1600, ε = 0.1.
In the initial period up to t = 30P/ε no tax is imposed (τ = 0). At tε/P = 30 a tax
rate (τ > 0) is introduced and then kept fixed for the rest of the simulation. The
tax rate increases from top (ε+ τ = 0.2) to bottom (ε+ τ = 2). .
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Fig. 4. Volatility (top), predictability (middle) and revenue (bottom) from spec-
ulators and producers for ns = 60 and nc = 1. Markers are data obtained from
numerical simulations of systems with different (effective) size L = PNs with cir-
cles, squares and diamonds corresponding to L = 3000, 6000, 12000 respectively.
Every data point represents an average over at least 1000 different strategy assign-
ments. Simulations are run for 400P +20Ns/(ε+τ) steps, with measurements taken
in the second half of this interval. Lines are the predictions of the analytical theory
for the infinite system.
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Fig. 5. Volatility as a function of ns at fixed nc = 1 for different tax rates
(ε+ τ = 0.1, 0.2 and 0.5). Markers represent data obtained from numerical simula-
tions with PNs = 3000, run for 200P + 200P/(ε + τ) steps (with measurements in
the second half of this interval). An average over 3000 samples is taken. Lines are
the corresponding predictions obtained from the analytical theory.
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Fig. 6. Volatility as a function of ε+τ in markets with slowly changing composition.
The parameter θ indicates the rate at which agents are replaced; on average one
replacement event occurs in the entire population every θP time-steps (see main
text for further details). Simulations are at nc = 1, ns = 20 and L = PNs = 5000
with an equilibration time T = 400P/(ε+ τ) and different values of θ as indicated.
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